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ABSTRACT
The social force of race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which communities are disproportionately affected by pollution. Scholars have described how people of color
are disproportionately victims of environmental discrimination and disparities because they lack
the necessary social capital to bring attention to their plight, as demonstrated by the case of the
Flint, Michigan, Water Crisis. In this article, we use a critical race theory lens to explore how the
Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case study of environmental racism. More specifically, we discuss
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents of Flint and conclude
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice for public health and social
science research.
KEYWORDS: Flint Water Crisis; environmental racism; critical race theory

Over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, much attention has been
paid to the inequitable exposure to pollution based on socioeconomic
status. In the United States, sources of pollution, such as toxic waste
dumps, incinerators, manufacturing plants, and other facilities, are
typically located in lower income neighborhoods. The social force of
race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which
communities are disproportionately affected by these environmental
factors. According to Hines (2015),
racially based environmental discrimination was made apparent
in 1971 when President Nixon’s Council on Environmental Quality
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acknowledged that racial discrimination negatively affects the quality
of environment among the urban poor. (pp. 198–199)

Scholars and activists have discussed extensively how people of color
are more exposed to toxic waste, are disproportionately the victims of
environmental discrimination and disparities, and suffer excessively
from environmentally related health problems (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994,
2000, 2001; Hines, 2015; Loh & Sugerman-Brozan, 2002; Mohai & Saha,
2007; Ringquist, 2005). The term used to describe this phenomenon is
environmental racism: racial discrimination in environmental policy
making, decision-making, and practice that results in inequitable distribution of environmental burdens based on race or color (Bullard,
2000). Most communities that are victims of environmental racism
are poor and African American or Latino (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994;
Bullard & Wright, 1986; Hines, 2001, 2015).
The challenge for environmental justice movements continues, as
courts and governmental agencies typically require solid evidence of
intentional discrimination in claims of environmental racism. However,
a wealth of evidence exists that points to the linkages between pollutants and the hazardous exposure of the communities that lie in close
proximity to them. Numerous studies have examined the ill-health effects of exposure to pollutants (Downey & Willegen, 2005; Hines, 2015;
Mohai & Bryant, 1992). Additional studies have linked diseases such
as cancer, cardiovascular disease, birth defects, respiratory problems,
and a host of other health complications to exposure to pollutants
from industrial facilities (Collins & Williams, 1999; Roux et al., 2001;
Geschwind, 1992; Lagatos, Wessen, & Zelen, 1986). Moreover, several
scholars have discussed the differential environmental risks based on
race and socioeconomic status (Bryant, 1995; Institute of Medicine, 1999;
Mohai, 1996; Mohai & Bryant, 1992; Szasz & Meuser, 1997). While some
would argue that class is the biggest indicator, research has shown that
race cannot be separated from class because race helps to perpetuate
a system of inequalities that create a space for acts of environmental
racism (Charles, 2003; Feagin, Vera, & Batur, 2001). In response, environmental justice efforts attempt to promote practices that enable equal
protection. However, as critical race theory scholars have contended,
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an unfortunate narrative frames racial practices like environmental
racism as historical incidences that no longer exist (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Dickinson, 2012; Tate, 1997). Yet, as the case of the Flint,
Michigan, Water Crisis demonstrates, spaces continue to be sites of
racialized practices and discrimination as the underlying historical
and political economic relations of racial inequality are perpetuated
in the present day. Unfortunately, the demographics of Flint, Michigan, have made it the poster child for a community that was most at
risk to experience the failure of our infrastructure in severe ways. The
population of Flint is 56.6% Black, with a median household income
from 2009 to 2013 of $24,830. Additionally, 41% of the population lives
below the poverty line, and only 11% holds an education of at least a
bachelor’s degree (U.S. Census, 2017). Consequently, the Flint Water
Crisis represents an ideal environmental racism case study because it
is a well-documented crisis that could have been prevented, echoing
Rothstein (2016) that “Flint matters because the water utility industry
can do better. The crisis, tragic in so many respects, also presents an
opportunity for lasting benefit—benefit from recognizing that we are
Flint” (p. 37). To understand the systematic factors that led to the Flint
Water Crisis, we will employ a critical race lens to see how Flint has
been a crisis in the making.
Flint Water Crisis

In April 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan, changed its water supply from
Detroit-supplied Lake Huron water to the Flint River, as an interim
source to save money while overhauling its supply system. Moving
forward, it is important to emphasize that the single, unitary motivator for the switch from Detroit-supplied water to water from the Flint
River was cost (Felton, 2016; Lin, 2016; Walters, 2016). Shortly after
the switch, residents noted concerns regarding water color, taste, and
odor (Carmody, 2016; Ganim & Tran, 2016; Ingraham, 2016; Laylin,
2016; Lurie, 2016). Findings from FlintWaterStudy.org concluded that
the water in Flint is 8.6 times more corrosive than water in Detroit
(Siddhartha, 2015). However, independent tests by the Flint River
Watershed Coalition contradicted this characterization. Their testing
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found chlorine levels ranging between 49 and 81 mg/L.1 Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) secondary (nonmandatory) limit for chloride
in drinking water is 250 mg/L, which is well above the level of the raw
water from the Flint River, and the danger in exceeding this limit is
merely “salty taste,” implying that the river itself cannot be to blame
for corrosion (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). This suggests
that, although the river certainly has faced a sordid history with pollution, something else must have caused the corrosion that caused lead
to leech into the drinking water.
Internal discussions and reports suggested that Flint’s water was so
corrosive as a result of the City of Flint Water Treatment Plant itself.
Prior to switching its water source to the Flint River, the City of Flint
bought all of its water from the City of Detroit. As a result of this longstanding deal, the Flint Water Treatment Plant ran only 4 days a year,
serving primarily as an emergency backup (Schuch, 2014). Before the
plant reopened, a series of poor decisions and oversights that would
propel the crisis had already been made. Internal e-mails from Mike
Glasgow, Flint’s laboratory and water quality supervisor, revealed a hurried operation to reopen the plant by Detroit’s April 25, 2014, deadline:
“if water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it
will be against my direction . . . but they [city officials] seem to have
their own agenda” (Egan, Spangler, & Shamus, 2016).
In response to increased bacteria levels in the city water soon after
the shift, the city increased the amount of chlorine it used to treat
the water, in turn causing increased levels of THM, a dangerous byproduct of the disinfection process (Gottesdiener, 2015). In response to
this problem, a report conducted by Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman
Inc. recommended increasing the treatment dosage of ferric chloride,
a coagulant that could help reduce THM levels (Gottesdiener, 2015).
These two actions, however, had the unfortunate side effect of making
the posttreatment water significantly more corrosive than even the pretreatment water. If the city had added any kind of corrosion inhibitor, as
had been present in the water they purchased from Detroit, this would
have been the end of their problems. However, city officials worried that
adding phosphates, a common inhibitor, might feed bacterial growth,
as those same compounds are frequently used in fertilizers (Flesher,
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2016). Disturbingly, Flint officials knew that increasing the water’s
ability to corrode, without adding any sort of inhibitor, was likely not
to end well; yet, they chose to proceed with a wait-and-see approach.
In a September 3, 2016, email to numerous state and local officials,
then public works director Howard Croft said a different concern had
been identified. As the city water plant was designed to begin treating
river water, “optimization for lead was addressed and discussed” with
an engineering firm and the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ). Croft continued, “It was determined that having more
data was advisable prior to the commitment of a specific optimization
method” (Flesher, 2016).
We believe that this choice to take a wait-and-see approach, in the
face of the myriad potential health problems caused by lead poisoning,
demonstrates a clear negligence on the part of the City of Flint, yet the
Flint River has become the scapegoat for the city’s inappropriate action
(Carmody, 2016; Laylin, 2016). While the pollution in Flint certainly
contributed to the crisis, emphasis on historic pollution rather than
recent misconduct deflects blame from the people who directly allowed
the crisis to occur. Therefore we agree with Brulle and Pellow (2006)
that the exploitation of the environment and human populations are
linked and that the key social dynamics that create this environmental inequality are (a) the functioning of the market economy and (b)
institutionalized racism. In this article, we use a critical race theory
(CRT) lens to argue how the Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case of
environmental racism and to what extent. More specifically, we discuss
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents
of Flint, Michigan, in terms of the ongoing water crisis and conclude
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice
for public health and social science research.
Critical Race Theory

CRT was developed in the mid-1970s as a number of scholars noticed
that there was a need for new theories and strategies to combat the
more covert forms of racism that were gaining ground in the era. The
basic CRT model consists of five elements: (a) the centrality of race
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and racism and their intersectionality with other forms of subordination, (b) the challenge to dominant ideology, (c) the commitment to
social justice, (d) the centrality of experiential knowledge, and (e) the
transdisciplinary perspective (Solorzano, 1997; Solorzano & Yasso,
2000). The heart of CRT lies in the rejection of color-blind orientations of equality, expressed as “rules that insist only on treatment that
is the same across the board, [as this] can thus remedy only the most
blatant forms of discrimination and instead calls for aggressive, color
conscious efforts to change the way things are” (Delgado & Stefancic,
2012, p. 49). Moreover, CRT argues for race-conscious decision-making
as a routine, nondeviant mode to be used in distributing positions of
wealth, prestige, and power (Guinier, 1995; Harris, 1995).
CRT also uniquely relies on narratives to substantiate claims. According to DeCuir and Dixson (2004), “an essential tenant [sic] of
Critical Race Theory is counter storytelling” (p. 27). Deconstructing and understanding narratives can be used “to reveal the circular,
self-serving nature of particular legal doctrines or rules” (Delgado &
Stefancic, 2001, p. xvii). While many scholars argue for universalism
over individual narratives, CRT emphasizes the role of individual narratives to the sense-making process, as we understand context through
narrative. The unique focus on narratives coupled with a call for raceconscious decision-making provides a useful lens when addressing
the complexities of environmental racism overall, and in particular
the Flint Water Crisis.
Flint and Environmental Racism

The case of the Flint Water Crisis demonstrates how the market economy and institutional racism have interacted in a manner to create a
space filled with discrimination toward poor minorities. However, to
understand the severity of the situation, we must look at the history of
Flint. The Flint Water Crisis has been 150 years in the making due to the
toxic legacy of the automotive industry operating in the city without
penalty, in part because of weak environmental regulations (Carmody,
2016; Craven & Tynes, 2016; Mailman School of Public Health, 2016;
Morley, 2016). The weak environmental regulations were due in part to
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the long-standing perception of the adverse economic effects of environmental policies. Therefore this crisis lies at the intersection of this
lengthy history of environmental pollution, racism, and shortsighted
governance. Although we argue that the most tangible smoking gun for
the crisis was the failure to use an inhibitor, such steps would not have
been necessary were the pollution addressed appropriately—Flint is a
derivative of a century of manipulation of the city’s residents (Rosner,
2016). Thus we must examine every step at which these damning decisions have been made to apply CRT properly.
Starting in the 1830s, industrial pollutants started to be introduced
into the Flint River by way of the first lumber mills in the area (Carmody, 2016). Soon afterward, paper mills started to settle into the city,
and with their arrival came chemical processing. The trend of pollution
continued as the city began to grow, reaching a population of 150,000 by
1930, as various industries arrived, such as the carriage and automobile
industries (Carmody, 2016). During this time, untreated waste was being discharged downstream, and the effects of tainted water could be
seen when the fish began to disappear, which was determined to be a
result of lowered oxygen levels in the river (Carmody, 2016).
The problem of water pollution grew as General Motors increased
its presence in the area in the 1940s through an investment strategy
focused on rural and suburban areas, resulting in the creation of eight
industrial complexes from 1940 to 1960 (Hakala, 2016). Although there
were discussions about water pollution in the 1940s, no regulations
forced businesses to treat and dilute their waste with city water until
the 1950s (Carmody, 2016). Following these new regulations was a
demand from the Michigan Water Resources Commission to Flint in
1960 to “abate unlawful pollution of the Flint River” (Carmody, 2016).
As a result, in 1967, Flint started to buy its water from Detroit, which
continued to be the case until spring 2014 (Carmody, 2016; Mailman
School of Public Health, 2016). General Motors helped to worsen the
situation because by the 1980s, most of General Motors’s Flint plants
were marked for potential noncompliance with EPA standards, partially
leading to the closure of existing plants in Flint one by one (Carmody,
2016). General Motors’s mistreatment of the people of Flint continued
because the company had knowledge that the water supply was tainted
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with high levels of chloride, which was rusting the company’s engine
blocks (Colias, 2016). Rather than notify officials, General Motors simply
switched its water supply, allowing the company to avoid a financial
pitfall while the residents of Flint suffered.
However, simply to blame General Motors for negligence would
paint an inaccurate picture of the forces that collided in Flint. The state
government made numerous missteps in its decision-making approach,
making them culpable for this crisis. When Michigan governor Rick
Synder was debating whether to change the water supply, he did not do
any pilot testing of Flint River water (Masten, Davies, & McElmurry,
2016). The only pilot test occurred in 2002, a treatability study, meaning
that the government was working with outdated information about the
water supply (Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman Inc., 2015) When you
consider the fact that the American Water Works Association clearly
recommends that “if a municipality is considering changing how its
source water is treated, the potential effects on the corrosivity of the
treated water and the need for corrosion control should be evaluated,”
and that no sufficient testing was ordered, the municipality did not
look out for its residents (Masten et al., 2016; Muylwyk et al., 2014).
This circulation of inaccurate information continued when the MDEQ
incorrectly identified the Flint water supply as being safe for human
use, which was then understood as accurate by other state agencies
(Campbell, Greenberg, Mankikar, & Ross, 2016; Flint Water Advisory
Task Force, 2016).
This poor decision-making continued even after government officials began to suspect a problem. Some of Synder’s staff realized the
severity of the Flint water situation and attempted to advocate for a
change in water supply, despite General Motors’s large role in creating
the problem. For instance, Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of
staff, stated in a February 5, 2017, email,
Since we’re in charge, we can hardly ignore the people of Flint. After all,
if GM refuses to use the water in their plant and our own agencies are
warning people not to drink it . . . we look pretty stupid hiding behind
some financial statement. (Covert, 2016)
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Additionally, like others on Synder’s staff, policy makers realized
that although General Motors used the Flint area until it was no longer
economically viable to do so, the State of Michigan still had a responsibility to the people of Flint. However, instead of moving forward
with switching the water supply, it took over a year for a solution to be
partially implemented. This history, coupled with a massive decline in
industrial and residential tax bases and lower city population densities,
reduced the water demand in the distribution system, exacerbating
problems with lead corrosion (Lewis, 1965; Zimmer & Hawley, 1956).
Additionally, Carmody’s (2016) investigation shed light on the Flint
River’s history with pollution, noting account after account of illegal
dumps, industrial carelessness, and the mess that followed.
Even more troubling is that several former Flint residents were in
positions of power within Michigan government. For instance, Michael
Gadola, a former Flint resident and a member of Snyder’s legal counsel,
voiced his concerns throughout the governor’s administration, but his
opinion was never requested by Darnell Earley, the state-appointed
emergency manager of Flint in April 2014 (Covert, 2016). Growing up
in Flint, Gadola knew that taking water from the Flint River was a poor
choice, but his position of power did nothing to help Flint residents,
because the economic cost of an imbalanced budget was too much to
bear (Covert, 2016). Compounding this, the MDEQ, the agency with
the responsibility of keeping drinking water safe, had limited resources
to monitor Michigan’s water (Roelofs, 2016). This combination demonstrates one particular instance of environmental racism within the Flint
Water Crisis: Despite personal narratives and a paper trail detailing the
economic mismanagement, the people of Flint were continually ignored.
Many residents also took note of how their voices had been ignored.
For example, resident Diane Thornton stated that the Flint Water Crisis
was “a blind disaster” and that “if we would have had a tornado or hurricane, they would have rushed in to help us” (Levin, n.d.). Instead of
support, Flint residents were and are continuing to be subjected to unfair
economic policies. A report by the Food and Water Watch (2016) found
that residents of Flint faced the single most expensive water service in
the entire country during 2015. The unfortunate irony of this situation
was not lost on the residents of Flint, as resident Helena Jones stated:
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“We’ve worked hard all our life, and we’ve paid our dues and pay our
taxes. And this is what we get” (Berlinger & Netto, 2016). Currently
8,000 Flint homeowners will receive tax liens because of unpaid water
bills, which can result in foreclosure of their homes (Delaney, 2017).
Furthermore, receiving these liens makes one ineligible for lead pipe
replacement (Dennis, 2017). The overpriced water, threat of tax liens,
and ultimately those liens disqualifying residents from lead pipe replacement clearly demonstrate to Flint residents that the State of Michigan
only considers their lives valuable if they can contribute economically.
At this point, even if state officials were to radically change course, the
damage would already have been done. Despite assurances that Flint
is working to resolve the crisis fully, “nearly three years later, many
residents still don’t trust the water. And they trust government officials
even less” (Dennis, 2017)—and for good reason.
Most troubling about the Flint Water Crisis is that attention was only
raised when a concerned team of physicians started to notice increases
in lead levels in children. Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, and Schnepp (2016)
tested children under the age of 5 years who had elevated blood lead
levels in Genesee County and found a striking increase in the percentage
of Flint children with elevated blood lead levels after the water source
switch. According to Attisha et al.,
as in many urban areas with high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage
and minority populations, we found a preexisting disparity in lead poisoning. . . . Flint children already suffer from risk factors that innately
increase their lead exposure: poor nutrition, concentrated poverty, and
older housing stock. (p. 286)

Following reports of increased blood lead levels in the children of
Flint, who were disproportionately poor and African American, many
began to question whether this issue constituted a case of environmental
racism (Eligon, 2016; Shafer, 2016). As we have noted previously, the
abhorrent series of policies regarding the residents affected by the crisis,
as well as the negligence that allowed such a crisis to happen in the first
place, most definitely constitute a case of environmental racism. The
pollution of the Flint River, as well as the economic conditions suffered
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by the people of Flint, created a dangerous intersection at which this
crisis could happen. As the crisis played out, the response by state officials, discussed below, has demonstrated fully this systemic racism.
As more and more attention was placed on the crisis through social
media and the sharing of narratives of residents, Flint city and Michigan state officials started to lob accusations of blame back and forth
at each other. As applying CRT requires identifying the true decision
makers, we must wade through this fog of accusations to determine
those responsible for policy. Prior to the mass releases of internal
e-mails of both city and state officials in 2016, a column penned by
Darnell Earley stated,
The decision to separate from Detroit Water and Sewerage Department
and go with the KWA [Karegnondi Water Authority], which included
the decision to pump Flint River water in the interim, were part of a
long-term plan that was approved by Flint’s mayor and confirmed by
a City Council vote of 7–1 on March 25, 2013. . . . The mayor’s approval
of the plan and the subsequent near unanimous vote by City Council
were in no way coerced, forced or demanded by the state, nor any
emergency manager. Council’s affirmative vote was supported and
signed as an Executive Order by then-Emergency Manager Edward
Kurtz on March 29, 2013.

The title of Earley’s column, “Don’t Blame EM for Flint Water Disaster,”
clearly demonstrates this article’s communicative purpose. However,
an email by Harvey Hollins, Michigan’s state director of urban initiatives, written 2 weeks prior to Earley’s column, stated unambiguously,
“It is important to note that council did not take a vote to use Flint
river” (Ridley, 2016). For Earley to write a column in which he claims
that not only was there a vote in favor of changing the water source
but that such a vote was nearly unanimous, 2 weeks after other state
officials explicitly noted that no vote took place, seems suspicious under
even the best possible interpretation. Furthermore, the most damning
instance of a governmental about-face was the purchase of bottled
water for government staff well before the state of emergency was declared in December 2015. Although officials claim the decision had no
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relationship whatsoever to the question of lead levels, “management
and budget department decided to provide water coolers in a Flint state
office building after the city sent out a notice saying it had been found
in violation of the state’s Safe Drinking Water Act because of high levels
of disinfection byproducts” (Oosting, 2016). Ignoring the discussion
on whether the government knew about the lead, its decision to limit
its own staff ’s exposure to potentially unsafe water, while telling its
residents not to worry, demonstrates clear negligence.
This represents the intersection of Flint’s troubled history with
systemic problems at the governmental level. The State of Michigan
stripped away Flint’s ability to make these choices for itself, meaning
those making the decisions would not be affected by the crisis. As that
crisis unfolded, despite government officials’ knowledge of problems
with the drinking water, public officials continued to tell the citizens
of Flint that the water coming through their pipes was safe for consumption. Worse yet, as those citizens sought accountability from their
government, that government responded by tossing blame back and
forth, possibly even consciously lying in the process. When considered
against the backdrop of Flint’s demographics, we see that it was only
a matter of time before Flint faced such a crisis. Moreover, according
to Jones (2017),
[the] inability to afford and have access to self-monitoring water quality
systems, absence of education on poisoning symptoms, lack of financial resources to just pick up and leave, and low political power and
economic mobility are all factors that aid in vulnerable communities
becoming victims to environmental justice.

Brulle and Pellow (2006) explained that the exploitation of the environment and human populations are linked because of the functioning
of the market economy and institutionalized racism, which led in this
case to environmental racism. As we have emphasized previously, the
city of Flint changed its water supply from Detroit-supplied water to
the Flint River solely to reduce costs for the government, even in the
face of known potential dangers. This initial attention to the bottom
line, the subsequent wait-and-see approach to potential dangers from
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Flint River water, the gross mishandling of the crisis, the clear economic
exploitation through tax liens, and the refusal to replace lead pipes for
anyone who cannot afford Flint’s astronomic water bills all coalesce to
demonstrate the relationship of environmental and human exploitation that is environmental racism. While no one in the government
intentionally tried to poison the people of Flint, attempting to enact a
color-blind decision-making process, it did poison the people of Flint
by ignoring the materiality of the situation (Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, 2017).
Implications for Environmental Justice

Investigations into cases of environmental racism have several implications for environmental justice and policy. Populations that have the
highest risks of water poisoning are also the least represented politically. Additionally, marginalized people who are at greater risk to be
victims of environmental racism and environmental injustice often
lack the agency and education to fight back. For this reason, grassroots
movements are needed to empower these vulnerable populations. We
have seen from the crisis in Flint that local residents occupying policymaking positions will not necessarily result in representative decisionmaking. For modern and future governments to practice justice for
marginalized communities, those communities must make their voices
heard on all levels; they cannot merely rely on good faith from the top.
Thus any discussion of the Flint Water Crisis would be incomplete
without consideration of the tactics we can employ to prevent such a
tragedy from happening again. The separation of these discussions,
and the consideration of them merely as academic issues, is a privilege
that is not enjoyed by those who are actually affected by these crises.
Laurent (2011) outlines four goals that must be achieved for communities to become more empowered: (a) People must have the opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect
their environment and/or health, (b) the public’s contribution must
be able to influence the regulatory agency’s decisions, (c) the public’s
concerns must be considered in the decision-making process, and (d)
the decision makers must seek out and facilitate the involvement of the
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potentially affected. For grassroots movements to be effective at creating effective policy changes, however, they cannot be a hollow gesture.
These movements need to make a genuine effort at understanding the
systemic factors that have led to environmental racism but also the
lived experiences of those affected by a system of inequality. Otherwise, these grassroots efforts are simply talking for these marginalized
groups without considering their perspective, undermining the goal
of the grassroots efforts and increasing the likelihood that such crises
will reappear in the near future. The crisis in Flint, combined with the
insultingly ineffective response to it on both a local and state level,
demonstrates that we still have much work to do toward enacting
these goals.
Conclusion

It is imperative that we learn from the mistakes of Flint. We have seen
the disastrous effects of the failure to acknowledge a history of environmental injustice, combined with current negligence and systemic
racism. Having applied CRT, we conclude that, quite simply, the Flint
Water Crisis could not have happened in a wealthier, whiter city and
therefore is a clear case of environmental racism. Flint city and Michigan
state officials felt they had the political capital to take their disastrous
wait-and-see approach because their constituents initially lacked the
political capital to resist. Yet, as the narrative of a scandal emerged and
solidified, state officials continued to feign a publicly ignorant aboutface, lobbing blame back on the city officials they had stripped power
from in the first place.
Lost amid this political bickering is an entire generation who will
face countless health problems from which they have little to no hope
of recovery. However, it is possible to change this narrative for future
generations, but it starts when we stop ignoring marginalized communities when they have concerns. We cannot simply wait and see when
an entire community raises its voice in resistance to the status quo.
Rather, we must consider their perspective, because it can help lead
to a greater understanding about particular crises. Flint is a tragedy,
but to prevent future ones, we must start giving marginalized groups
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a seat at the table, increasing their agency regarding decisions about
their health and environment.
Tomeka M. Robinson, PhD, is an associate professor in rhetoric and
public advocacy and director of forensics at Hofstra University. She
primarily teaches courses in intercultural, organizational, and health
communication, and her scholarly interests lie at the intersections of
health, culture, and policy.
Sabrina Singh is a first-year MA student at the University of Montana.
She is studying communication studies with a concentration in health
and organizational communication. Her primary scholarly interests lie
in the interplay between health risks and communities of color.
Garrett Shum is a senior-year undergraduate at Hofstra University. He
is studying rhetoric and public advocacy, linguistics, philosophy, and the
Japanese language. His primary scholarly interests are in intercultural
communication and epistemology.
ORCID

Tomeka M. Robinson

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7766-9875
Note

1. See http://flintriver.org/blog/

318

robinson, shum, and singh

References
Attisha, M., LaChance, J., Sadler, R., & Schnepp, A. (2016). Elevated blood
lead levels in children associated with the Flint drinking water crisis: A
spatial analysis of risk and public health response. American Journal of
Public Health, 106, 283–290. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003
Berlinger, J., & Netto, J. (2016, January 21). Voices of Flint: How residents are
coping. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-resident
-voices/index.html
Brulle, R. J., & Pellow, D. N. (2006). Environmental justice: Human health
and environmental inequalities. Annual Review Public Health, 27, 103–124.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.27.021405.102124
Bullard, R. D. (1992). Race and the incidence of environmental hazards: A time
for discourse. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Bullard, R. D. (1993). Confronting environmental racism. Boston, MA: South
End.
Bullard, R. D. (1994). Unequal protection. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.
Bullard, R. D. (2000). Dumping in Dixie: Race, class, and environmental quality. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bullard, R. D. (2001). Environmental justice in the 21st century: Race still
matters. Phylon, 49, 151–171. https://doi.org/10.2307/3132626
Bullard, R., & Wright, B. (1986). The politics of pollution: Implication for the
Black community. Phylon, 47(1), 71–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/274696
Bryant, B. (1995). Pollution prevention and participatory research as a methodology for environmental justice. Virginia Environmental Law Journal,
14, 589–613. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24782273
Campbell, C., Greenberg, R., Mankikar, D., & Ross, R. D. (2016). A case study
of environmental injustice: The failure in Flint. International Journal of
Environmental Research and Public Health, 13, Article 951. https://doi
.org/10.3390/ijerph13100951
Carmody, T. (2016, February 26). How the Flint River got so toxic. The Verge.
Retrieved from http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-mich
igan-water-crisis-lead-pollution-history
Charles, C. A. (2003). The dynamics of racial residential segregation. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 167–207. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev
.soc.29.010202.100002

Politically Unhealthy

319

Colias, M. (2016). How GM saved itself from Flint water crisis. Retrieved from
http://www.autonews.com/article/20160131/OEM01/302019964/how-gm
-saved-itself-from-flint-water-crisis
Collins, C. A., & Williams, D. (1999). Segregation and mortality: The deadly
effects of racism? Sociology Forum, 14, 495–523. https://doi.org/10.1023
/A:1021403820451
Covert, B. (2016, February 26). Snyder aide says governor knew about Flint
water issues a year before action was taken. Retrieved from https://think
progress.org/snyder-aide-says-governor-knew-about-flint-water-issues
-a-year-before-action-was-taken-308444eb494/
Craven, J., & Tynes, T. (2016, February 3). The racist roots of Flint’s water
crisis. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/racist-roots-of-flints-water-crisis_us_56b12953e4b04f9b57d7b118
DeCuir, J., & Dixson, A. (2004). So when it comes out, they aren’t that surprised that it is there: Using critical race theory of analysis of race and
racism in education. Educational Researcher, 33(5), 26–31. https://doi
.org/10.3102/0013189X033005026
Delaney, A. (2017, May 3). Some Flint residents could face foreclosure over
unpaid water bills. Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/entry/flint-residents-unpaid-water-bills-foreclosure_us
_5909e494e4b05c397684e4ec
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2001). Critical race theory: An introduction. New
York, NY: New York University Press.
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2012). Critical race theory: An introduction (2nd
ed.). New York, NY: New York University Press.
Dennis, B. (2017, February 28). Flint residents must start paying for water they
still can’t drink without a filter. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/28
/flint-residents-must-start-paying-for-water-they-still-cant-drink-without
-a-filter/
Dickinson, E. (2012). Addressing environmental racism through storytelling:
Toward an environmental justice narrative framework. Communication,
Culture, and Critique, 5, 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-9137.2012.01119.x
Downey, L., & Willegen, M. (2005). Environmental stressors: The mental
health impacts of living near industrial activity. Journal of Health and
Social Behavior, 46, 289–305.

320

robinson, shum, and singh

Egan, P., Spangler, T., & Shamus, K. J. (2016, February 12). E-mails: Flint water
plant was rushed into operation. Detroit Free Press. Retrieved from http://
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/12/e
-mails-flint-water-plant-rushed-into-operation/80300220/
Eligon, J. (2016, January 22). A question of environmental racism in Flint.
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22
/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-in-flint.html
Environmental Protection Agency. (2017, February 8). Secondary drinking water
standards: Guidance for nuisance chemicals. Retrieved from https://www
.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/secondary-drinking-water-standards
-guidance-nuisance-chemicals
Feagin, J., Vera, H., & Batur, P. (2001). White racism: The basics. Cambridge,
England: Routledge.
Flesher, J. (2016, February 10). Email: Anti-corrosive chemicals weren’t applied
to Flint pipes over bacteria worries. Retrieved from http://detroit.cbslocal
.com/2016/02/10/email-anti-corrosive-chemicals-werent-applied-to-flint
-pipes-over-bacteria-worries/
Felton, R. (2016, January 23). How Flint traded safe drinking water for costcutting plan that didn’t work. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/23/flint-water-crisis-cost-cutting
-switch-water-supply
Flint Water Advisory Task Force. (2016). Flint water task force final report.
Lansing, MI: Office of Governor Rick Snyder.
Food and Water Watch. (2016, February 16). The state of public water in the
United States. Retrieved from https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight
/state-public-water-united-states
Ganim, S., & Tran, L. (2016, January 13). How tap water became toxic in Flint,
Michigan. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic
-tap-water-flint-michigan/
Geschwind, S. (1992). Risk of congenital malformations associated with proximity to hazardous waste sites. American Journal of Epidemiology, 135,
1197–1207. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a116226
Gottesdiener, L. (2015, April 3). Flint, Mich., residents find state water control hard to swallow. Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from http://america
.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/3/flint-residents-find-state-water-control
-hard-to-swallow.html

Politically Unhealthy

321

Guinier, L. (1995). Groups, representation, and race-conscious districting: A
case of the emperor’s clothes. In K. Crenshaw (Ed.), Critical race theory:
The key writings that formed the movement (pp. 205–236). New York, NY:
New York University Press.
Hakala, J. (2016). Flint’s struggles began with GM’s move to suburbs in 1940s,
historian says. Michigan Radio. Retrieved from http://michiganradio.org
/post/flints-struggles-began-gms-move-suburbs-1940s-historian-says
Harris, C. (1995). Whiteness as property. In K. Crenshaw (Ed.), Critical race
theory: The key writings that formed the movement (pp. 276–291). New
York, NY: New York University Press.
Hines, R. (2001). African Americans’ struggle for environmental justice and
the case of the Shintech plant: Lessons learned from a war wage. Journal
of Black Studies, 31, 777–789. https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470103100605
Hines, R. (2015). The price of pollution: The struggle for environmental justice in Mossville, Louisiana. Western Journal of Black Studies, 39, 198–208.
Ingraham, C. (2016, January 15). This is how toxic Flint’s water really is.
Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2016/01/15/this-is-how-toxic-flints-water-really-is/?utm_term
=.7c858cdf431e
Institute of Medicine. (1999). Toward environmental justice: Research, education, and health policy needs. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Jones, D. (2017, March 7). Flint Water Crisis: The importance of building a
grassroots environmental justice infrastructure. Retrieved from http://
lawatthemargins.com/2553-2/
Lagatos, S. W., Wessen, B. J., & Zelen, M. (1986). An analysis of contaminated
well water and health effects in Woburn, Massachusetts. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 81, 583–596. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459
.1986.10478307
Laurent, E. (2011). Issues in environmental justice within the European Union.
Ecological Economics, 70, 1846–1853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon
.2011.06.025
Laylin, T. (2016, January 18). How Michigan’s Flint River came to poison a
city. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environ
ment/2016/jan/18/michigan-flint-river-epa-lead-contamination-mdeq
-pollutants-water-safety-health
Levin, S. (n.d.). Still standing: Flint residents tell their stories about living with

322

robinson, shum, and singh

poisoned water. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf
/page/still_standing_flint_residents.html
Lewis, P. F. (1965). Impact of negro migration on the electoral geography of
Flint, Michigan, 1932–1962: A cartographic analysis. Annual Association
of American Geography, 55(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1965
.tb00504.x
Lin, J. (2016, January 15). The reach of lead in Flint’s water supply. New York
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/15
/us/flint-lead-water-michigan.html
Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman Inc. (2015). Trihalomethane formation concerns: Operational evaluation report. Flint, MI: City of Flint.
Loh, P., & Sugerman-Brozan, J. (2002). Environmental justice organizing
for environmental health: Case study on asthma and diesel exhaust in
Roxbury, Massachusetts. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 584, 110–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620258400108
Lurie, J. (2016, January 26). A toxic timeline of Flint’s water fiasco. Mother
Jones. Retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/01
/flint-lead-water-crisis-timeline
Mailman School of Public Health. (2016). Flint’s toxic industrial legacy. Retrieved from https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/public-health-now
/news/flints-toxic-industrial-legacy
Masten, S. J., Davies, S. H., & McElmurry, S. P. (2016). Flint water crisis: What
happened and why? Journal of the American Water Works Association,
108(12), 22–34. https://doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2016.108.0195
Michigan Civil Rights Commission. (2017). The Flint water crisis: Systemic
racism through the lens of Flint. Lansing, MI: Author.
Mohai, P. (1996). Environmental justice of analytic justice? Social Science
Quarterly, 77, 500–507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/i40108871
Mohai, O., & Bryant, B. (1992). Environmental racism: Reviewing the evidence.
In B. Bryant & P. Mohaid (Eds.), Race and the incidence of environmental
hazards (pp. 163–176). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Mohai, P., & Saha, R. (2007). Racial inequality in the distribution of hazardous
waste: A national level reassessment. Social Problems, 54, 343–370. https://
doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.3.343
Morley, M. (2016, February 10). Highsmith: Flint crisis a long time coming and
could have been prevented. Retrieved from https://wdet.org/posts/2016/02

Politically Unhealthy

323

/10/82461-highsmith-flint-crisis-a-long-time-coming-and-could-have
-been-prevented/
Muylwyk, Q., Sandvig, A., & Snoeyink, V. (2014). Developing corrosion control
for drinking water systems. Opflow, 40(11), 24–27. https://doi.org/10.5991
/OPF.2014.40.0073
Oosting, J. (2016, January 28). State staff in Flint got water before crisis
emerged. Detroit News. Retrieved from http://www.detroitnews.com
/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/01/28/progress-michigan
-flint-water/79483054/
Ridley, G. (2016, February 26). Flint water emails show Flint City Council never
approved switch. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index
.ssf/2016/02/snyders_staff_signed_off_on_ed.html
Ringquist, E. J. (2005). Assessing evidence of environmental inequities: A
meta analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24, 223–247.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20088
Roelofs, T. (2016, February 10). Signs of trouble at MDEQ, years before Flint water crisis. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/02
/signs_of_trouble_at_mdeq_years.html
Rosner, D. (2016). Flint, Michigan: A century of environmental injustice.
American Journal of Public Health, 106, 200–201. https://doi.org/10.2105
/AJPH.2015.303011
Rothstein, E. P. (2016). Why Flint matters. Journal of the American Water Works
Association, 108(7), 36–42. https://doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2016.108.0136
Roux, A. V. D., Merkin, S. S., Arnett, D., Chambless, L., Massing, M., Nieto,
F. J., . . . Watson, R. L. (2001). Neighborhood of residence and incidence
of coronary heart disease. New England Journal of Medicine, 345, 99–106.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM200107123450205
Schuch, S. (2014, March 12). Flint residents should be drinking Flint River water
by mid-April, officials say. Available at http://www.mlive.com/news/flint
/index.ssf/2014/03/flint_residents_should_be_drin.html
Shafer, G. (2016). Confronting whiteness and the Flint water crisis. The Humanist, 3, 22–26.
Siddhartha, R. (2015, September 29). Research update: Corrosivity of Flint
water to iron pipes in the city—a costly problem. Retrieved from http://
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/research-update-corrosivity-of-flint-water
-to-iron-pipes-in-the-city-a-costly-problem/

324

robinson, shum, and singh

Solorzano, D. (1997). Images and words that wound: Critical race theory, racial
stereotyping, and teacher education. Teacher Education Quarterly, 24, 5–19.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23478088
Solorzano, D., & Yasso, T. (2000). Toward a critical race theory of Chicana
and Chicano education. In C. Tejeda, C. Martinez, & Z. Leonardo (Eds.),
Demarcating the border of Chicana(o)/Latina(o) education (pp. 35–65).
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Szasz, A., & Meuser, M. (1997). Environmental inequalities: Literature review
and proposals for new directions in research and theory. Current Sociology,
45(3), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/001139297045003006
Tate, W. F. (1997). Critical race theory and education: History, theory, and
implications. Review of Research in Education, 22, 195–247. https://doi
.org/10.1177/1077800414557825
U.S. Census Data. (2017). Quickfacts, Flint city, Michigan. Retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00
Walters, J. (2016, January 21). Flint water crisis: Governor’s brand of corporate
politics set stage for disaster. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/21/michigan-governor-rick-snyder
-flint-water-crisis
Zimmer, B. G., & Hawley, A. H. (1956). Approaches to the solution of fringe
problems: Preferences of residents in the Flint metropolitan area. Public
Administration Review, 16, 258–268. https://doi.org/10.2307/973138

